Current Research 

In a series of papers in progress, I argue for a number of structural differences between belief and action, theoretical and practical reason, and explore the significance of these differences. Practical reasoning concerns itself with considerations that favor actions, characteristically by promoting some aim of the agent, and it concludes with a decisions in favor of some course of action; but, contrary to some received philosophical opinions, I say, theoretical reasoning isn't specially concerned with favoring, aims, or decisions. I try to imagine the kind of epistemology that emerges when we accept this fact, and show how it illuminates questions about epistemic agency, practical reasons for belief, and the nature of epistemic norms. 

I also have general interests in metaethics, especially in the authority of normativity and the role of normative concepts. I have recently had the honor of a (very gracious) public refutation in The Journal of Philosophy

Works in Progress

Published Works