Matthew Vermaire - Research

Current Research

In a series of papers in progress, I argue for a number of structural differences between belief and action, theoretical and practical reason, and explore the significance of these differences. Practical reasoning concerns itself with considerations that favor actions, characteristically by promoting some aim of the agent, and it concludes with a decisions in favor of some course of action; but, contrary to some received philosophical opinions, I say, theoretical reasoning isn't specially concerned with favoring, aims, or decisions. I try to imagine the kind of epistemology that emerges when we accept this fact, and show how it illuminates questions about epistemic agency, practical reasons for belief, and the nature of epistemic norms.

I also have general interests in metaethics, especially in the authority of normativity and the role of normative concepts. Not too long ago I had the honor of a (very gracious) public refutation in The Journal of Philosophy.

Works in Progress

A paper on the transparency of doxastic deliberation to truth
A paper on parallelisms between ethics and epistemology
A paper on combining practical and epistemic reasons for belief
A paper on views of judgment as an intentional action

Published Works

"Nudging for Judging that p," forthcoming in The Philosophical Quarterly, was co-written with my friend Oscar Piedrahita. We take up the notion of "nudges" introduced by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein—roughly, lightweight interventions for influencing people's behavior—and think about how to get that notion doing epistemological work. The key, we say, is to focus less on the precise psychological processes through which nudges are supposed to operate, and put the put the emphasis on whether or not interventions make a rational difference for behavior or belief.
"Judgment's Aimless Heart," in Noûs, argues against the view that, when we form beliefs, we're aiming at believing truly. In order to do this, we'd have to be guided by a view about what the truth is—and that's precisely what we don't yet have, when we're forming beliefs. The form of theoretical rationality, then, is not the form of aim-guided action in pursuit of an epistemic good.
"In Search of Doxastic Involuntarism," in Philosophical Studies, rebuts a number of arguments for the view that, necessarily, believing is not an intentional action. Moreover, I say, attention to the failures of these arguments shows that it's hard to frame involuntarism in any form that is both plausible and significant. (Pre-print here.)
"Against Schmought," in The Journal of Philosophy, responds to a metaethical problem raised by the prospect of alternative normative concepts—concepts that are used like our concepts RIGHT and WRONG, but that apply to different actions. If you've been worried about those, maybe I can set you at ease: I argue we're rationally required to reject such concepts, because of the incoherent commitments we would be making by countenancing them. (Pre-print here.)
"Retraction and Testimonial Justification: A New Problem for the Assurance View," in Philosophical Studies, makes trouble for one way of understanding how we're rational in believing what people tell us. It can't be that it's a matter of a testifier being held responsible for the truth of our beliefs, I say, because in some interesting cases—ones involving retractions—you get rational testimonial belief without such responsibility. Along the way we get to investigate how the speech-act of retraction works, which is kind of fun in its own right. (Pre-print here.)